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The universal blind quantum computation (UBQC) protocol [A. Broadbent, J. Fitzsimons, and
E. Kashefi, in Proceedings of the 50th Annual IEEE Symposiumon Foundations of Computer Science
(IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos, CA, USA, 2009), pp. 517–526.] allows a client to perform
quantum computation on a remote server. In an ideal setting, perfect privacy is guaranteed if the client is
capable of producing specific, randomly chosen single qubit states. While from a theoretical point of view,
this may constitute the lowest possible quantum requirement, from a pragmatic point of view, generation
of such states to be sent along long distances can never be achieved perfectly. We introduce the concept of
 blindness for UBQC, in analogy to the concept of  security developed for other cryptographic
protocols, allowing us to characterize the robustness and security properties of the protocol under possible
imperfections. We also present a remote blind single qubit preparation protocol with weak coherent pulses
for the client to prepare, in a delegated fashion, quantum states arbitrarily close to perfect random single
qubit states. This allows us to efficiently achieve -blind UBQC for any  > 0, even if the channel
between the client and the server is arbitrarily lossy.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.200502 PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Ac, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Lx
While modern advances in quantum information are
making strides towards scalable quantum computers, the
dream of small and privately owned quantum computers
remains very distant. Realistically, large quantum servers
may in the near future take a role similar to that occupied
by massive superclusters today. They will be remotely
accessed by a large number of clients, using their home-
based simple devices, to solve tasks which seem difficult
for classical computers, while enjoying full privacy guar-
anteed by an efficient cryptographic scheme.
Various protocols have been devised with the goal of
realizing such delegated, yet private and secure, quantum
computing [1–5]. These protocols vary upon their require-
ments for the client and the achievable level of security.
Among them, the universal blind quantum computing
(UBQC) proposed by Broadbent, Fitzsimons and Kashefi
[1] stands as the optimal one, with the lowest requirements
on the client: in particular, no quantum memory is needed.
The security offered by the ideal UBQC protocol is
unconditional: the server cannot learn anything about the
client computation, input or output. This flavor of security
is called blindness. The feasibility of UBQC using differ-
ent physical resources has been addressed [5,6] and the
potential of UBQC already has prompted experimental
demonstrations on a small scale [7].
The only ‘‘nonclassical’’ requirement for the client in
the ideal UBQC is that she can prepare single qubits in the
state jþi ¼ 1ﬃﬃ2p ðj0i þ eij1iÞ with 2f0;=4; . . . ;7=4g.
The blindness of the UBQC protocol has only been estab-
lished in the ideal case where the client prepares perfect
qubits. In any physical implementation, however, the
preparation will inevitably be imperfect and this has to
be taken into account before making any statement about
security. For instance, the qubits could be encoded in the
polarization of a single photon generated by a realistic
single photon source. Then completely suppressing the
probability of inadvertently sending two or more identi-
cally polarized photons instead of one is very difficult, yet
such an event would invalidate the perfect privacy of the
client. While the future may bring scalable and fault-
tolerant quantum computation required for the server, per-
fect quantum devices required to guarantee perfect security
for the client are unlikely to ever be achieved in practice.
The main contribution of this Letter is towards this
direction: we investigate the security of UBQC with
realistic imperfections for the client. For this purpose,
we introduce the framework of approximate blindness
( blindness) where the (small) parameter  quantifies
the maximal probability of successfully distinguishing
between the actual protocol and the ideal one introduced
in [1]. A similar approach to defining approximate security
has been a milestone in the context of cryptography, and
recently extended to the case of quantum key distribution
(QKD) [8,9] and other quantum cryptographic primitives
in the, so-called, bounded storage and noisy storage models
[10–12].
We will show that the level of security is indeed higher
when the states prepared by the client are closer to the ideal
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qubits. We then introduce a protocol allowing the client to
prepare the qubits in a delegated fashion at the server’s
location. The client needs to encode the quantum informa-
tion into the polarization of weak coherent pulses which
are sent to the server through an arbitrarily lossy quantum
channel. Therefore, the burden of preparing very good
qubits is put on the server, who needs, in particular, to be
able to perform nondemolition quantum measurements
[13]. We will show that these realistic requirements (for
the client) are compatible with -blind UBQC, where  can
be made arbitrarily small. This approach shares striking
similarities with the history of QKD where the initial pro-
tocols required true single photons but later became com-
patible with the much more practical weak coherent pulses.
We begin with a brief recap of the UBQC protocol.
Universal blind quantum computation.—The UBQC
protocol is set in the framework of measurement-based
quantum computation (MBQC) [14–16]. In MBQC the
underlying resource is a multipartite entangled quantum
state and the computation is executed by performing mea-
surements on its subsystems. In particular, this resource
state can be a generic brickwork state, a close relative of the
cluster state (see Supplemental Material for details [17]).
By applying single qubit measurements parametrized
by a measurement angle  from the discrete set
f0; =4; . . . ; 7=4g, which collapse the measured qubit
state to one of the two eigenstates fji ¼ 1ﬃﬃ2p 
ðj0i  eij1iÞg, with corresponding eigenvalues 1, one
can achieve universal quantum computation [1]. Here, the
computation itself is encoded in the measurement angles
alone and the underlying resource is generic.
The classical and quantum part of MBQC can be concep-
tually separated. One can imagine a classical controller
which generates the measurement angles and a quantum
unit which prepares the resource state, performs the mea-
surements (as dictated by the controller unit), and returns the
measurement outcomes to the controller unit. The outcomes
are crucial for the adaptive structure of MBQC: since they
are probabilistic, the subsequent measurement angles must
depend on them to ensure deterministic computation [18,19].
The central idea behind UBQC is to use this separation
and allocate the classical controller unit to the client and
the quantum unit to the server. To ensure privacy, however,
the computation needs to be encoded: this is achieved in
UBQC by effectively encoding the resource state.
The standard procedure for MBQC, to prepare the re-
source state, is to start with a set of qubits in a fixed state,
say jþi :¼ jþ0i, and to apply an entangling operation of
the controlled phase gate (CTRL-Z) to some of them.
In UBQC, by contrast, the client will provide the initial
phase rotated qubits of the form jþi to the server, without
informing him of the values of  2 f0; =4; . . . ; 7=4g.
Applying the entangling gates then prepares an encoded
resource state. Now, if one was to measure a qubit in the
usual MBQC protocol with some measurement angle ,
this would be equivalent to measuring the prerotated qubit
in the state jþiwith the angle 0 ¼ þ mod 2, as the
phase rotation and CTRL-Z gate commute. In this case, the
measurement angle alone says nothing about the compu-
tation run, but a malicious server may still try to learn
something about  when given 0, hence also about 
(i.e., about the computation).
To solve this security loophole, UBQC exploits the
probabilistic nature of MBQC. The client sends a modified
measurement angle  ¼ þ þ rmod 2 where r 2
f0; 1g is chosen randomly by the client and hidden from the
server. The value of r can be interpreted as a flip of the
measurement outcome, which can be easily compensated
by the client.
Now the quantum information (prerotated qubits) and
classical information (measurement angles) accessible to
the server are no longer correlated to the client’s desired
computational angles (denoted ), and this constitutes the
crux of the proof of blindness of UBQC [1].
One can summarize the UBQC protocol as follows:
Initially, in the preparation phase, the client sends S (the
size of the computation) randomly prerotated qubits in
the states fjþiigSi¼1, to the server, keeping the angles i
secret. The server then builds up the brickwork state
using the received qubits and the CTRL-Z interaction.
Proceeding sequentially on each qubit, if the desired
measurement angle for qubit i was i (defined for the
non-prerotated resource state, and including the necessary
adaptations to the angle based on prior measurement
outcomes sk<i), the client will ask the server to measure
the qubit with respect to the angle i ¼ i þ i þ
rimod 2 where the binary parameter ri is chosen
randomly. The server reports each measurement outcome
si which the client flips if ri ¼ 1.
In the case of an honest server, this procedure yields the
correct outcome of the computation. Moreover, regardless
of the malicious activity of the server the client’s privacy is
unconditional—the protocol is blind (see Supplemental
Material for details [17]).
This blindness, however, only holds if the client can
prepare the needed qubits perfectly. In a practical imple-
mentation, imperfection is inevitable and perfect blindness
cannot be achieved. For this reason, a notion of approxi-
mate blindness is required.
Approximate blindness.—A difficulty in characterizing
the UBQC protocol is that it is adaptive. However, as far
as blindness is concerned, the reported outcomes si of the
server do not matter; they only affect the correctness of
the protocol [20]. Hence one can assume si ¼ 0 (i.e., the
server measurement always projects into the þ1 eigen-
value, similar to a post-selection scenario), and since the
random parameters ri can be chosen in advance, the need
for the adaptive structure can be ignored. Therefore,
blindness can be studied through the following joint state
of the client and server:
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;
which contains all the relevant information pertaining to
the security of a run of a UBQC protocol as seen by the
server [21]. In this classical-quantum state, S denotes the
overall size of the computation. The client’s register con-
tains the user’s secret classical information—the computa-
tional angles i characterizing the desired computation,
and the ri parameters chosen randomly and unknown to the
server. The server’s register contains quantum information—
the qubits in states jþii which are sent by the client, as well
as the measurement angles i. Note thati, ri and i are all
represented by classical, orthogonal states.
If the information shared by the client and the server can
be described by the state idealAB , then a malicious server
cannot learn anything about the computation of the client
[1]. Since the security holds for any action of the server,
any UBQC protocol described by a state of the form
ð1A  EÞidealAB (1)
for any completely positive trace preserving (CPTP) map E
(representing any possible deviation from the protocol by
the server) is equally blind. We refer to such states as
unconditionally blind states and define the family F of
such states as follows:
F ¼ fð1A  EÞidealAB jE is a CPTP mapg: (2)
In order to analyze the impact of imperfections caused
by a realistic implementation, we consider the settings
where the client sends general states i instead of the
perfect states jþii. In this case, the joint state representing
all the information exchanged in the protocol is given by:
f
i g
AB ¼
1
24S
X
~;~r
O
i2½S
jiihijjriihrij|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Client
ijiihij|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Server
: (3)
We can now introduce the notion of  blindness:
Definition 1.—A UBQC protocol with imperfect client
preparation described by the shared joint state 
fi g
AB is 
blind if the trace distance between the family of uncondi-
tionally blind states and the state 
fi g
AB is less than :
min
"
AB
2F
1
2
k fi gAB  "AB k : (4)
Such a notion of security is particularly desirable as it is
composable [9,22–24]. One can also extend it to a more
general setting considering prior knowledge about the
computation (see Supplemental Material [17]).
If the states i generated by the client are uncorrelated
(which holds for instance if the process determining the
parameters i is random and memoryless), the distance
between the perfectly blind state and the approximate state
f
i g
AB can be bounded in terms of the distance between the
individual states i and the corresponding perfect qubit
states jþii. In particular, defining
prep ¼ max
i
1
2
k i  "ðjþiihþi jÞ k (5)
for some CPTP map E independent of all i, then one can
show (see Supplemental Material [17]) that
min
"AB2F
1
2
k fi gAB  "AB k Sprep: (6)
This means that the ability to prepare good approximations
of the states jþii translates into the ability to perform
approximately blind universal quantum computing.
This, however, is not completely satisfying from the
client’s perspective. Indeed, the client can only achieve a
given value of prep in practice, meaning that for a fixed
security parameter , she cannot perform a computation
with more that =prep steps. In order to allow for compu-
tation of arbitrary size, it is necessary to prepare arbitrary
good qubits and the solution is to delegate this task to the
server, who is assumed to be much more powerful than
the client.
We proceed by presenting such a remote blind qubit
state preparation (RBSP) protocol where the client only
needs to prepare weak coherent pulses with a given polar-
ization. The requirements for the client are therefore mini-
mal. In particular, they are the same as in most practical
implementations of discrete-variable QKD. The difficulty
here is transferred to the server who has to perform a
quantum nondemolition measurement to obtain the desired
qubit. As we will show, using the RBSP protocol S times,
the client can reach a joint state 
fi g
AB which is " close to
the family F of perfectly blind states.
UBQC with remote blind qubit state preparation using
weak coherent pulses.—The RBSP protocol is designed to
serve as a substitute for the process of sending one indi-
vidual perfect random qubit which allows for imperfect
devices and an imperfect channel.
Ideally, its outcome will satisfy the following properties:
(A) the state in the server’s possession is EðjþihþjÞ for a
CPTP map E, independent of  known to the client alone—
guaranteeing perfect blindness, see Eq. (5); (B) the protocol
is never aborted in the honest server scenario—guaranteeing
robustness of the encompassing UBQC; (C) in the honest
server scenario, the map E is the identity—guaranteeing the
correctness of the UBQC protocol.
When imperfections are taken into account, the UBQC
using RBSP in the preparation phase approaches the prop-
erties of blindness and robustness asymptotically. Hence,
we are interested in the following properties:  blindness,
as described above, and  robustness which guarantees that
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the honest abort probability is less than . Despite the
imperfect preparation stage, we also show that the correct-
ness of the protocol holds in the honest scenario, whenever
the client does not abort.
To run the RBSP protocol, the client sends a sequence
of N weak coherent pulses (small amplitude, phase-
randomized coherent states) with random polarization 
in the set f0; =4; . . . ; 7=4g to the server. If the trans-
mittance of the channel from the client to the server is
supposed to be at least T, then the mean photon number of
the source is set to  ¼ T [25]. The introduced phase
randomization simplifies the security analysis and causes
the state emitted from the source to be:
 ¼ X1
k¼0
pkjkihkj
where jki :¼ jþik corresponds to k photons, occurring
with probability pk ¼ eTTk=k!, with polarization .
Each pulse is then a probabilistic mixture of Fock states.
The Poissonian distribution obtained here is not crucial for
the RBSP protocol. For instance, it would work equally
well (with readjustment of parameters) with any source
realizing a mixture of polarization encoded photon number
states, such as polarized thermal states, provided that the
probability of getting a single photon is not too small.
The server then performs nondemolition photon number
measurements on the pulses he receives, declaring the
number outcomes to the client. This additional requirement
on the quantum server, while a challenging task has, al-
ready been experimentally implemented [26]. At this point,
the client checks the number of reported vacuum states—if
this number is greater than NðeT2 þ T2=6Þ, she aborts the
protocol. A higher value would be indicative to either a
lossier than believed channel, or more importantly, that the
server lied in an attempt to cheat.
If the protocol was not aborted, the server performs the
interlaced 1D cluster computation (I1DC) subroutine ,
using the photons obtained by the number measurement
of the received coherent pulses. In this subroutine, the
server couples the first and the second qubit (i.e., photons)
with the interaction CTRL-Z. (H  1), and the first qubit of
the pair is then measured in the Pauli X basis and the
measurement outcome is sent to the client. The remaining
qubit is then coupled to the third qubit in the input set and
measured in the same basis. This process is repeated until
only one qubit remains unmeasured, in some state jþi.
Using her knowledge about the polarizations of each
of the pulses initially sent, and the reported binary string
of outcomes, the client can compute the angle 
(see Supplemental Material for details [17]). The pair 
(held by the client) and jþi (held by the server), is the
required outcome of the RBSP protocol.
The intuition behind this protocol is the following. The
I1DC subroutine is such that if the server is totally ignorant
about the polarization of at least one photon in the 1D
cluster, then he is also totally ignorant about the final angle
. In order to exploit this property, the client should make
sure that the server will at least once measure a single
photon and put it in the cluster. The cheating strategy for
the server consists in claiming he received 0 photon when
he received 1 and claiming he received 1 when he in fact
measured several (in which case he can learn something
about their polarization). In order to avoid this attack,
the client simply verifies that the reported statistics of
the server are compatible with the assumed transmittance
of the channel. Note that the server cannot learn anything
useful, even if he deviates from the prescribed I1DC
subroutine, if one of the weak coherent pulses generated
one photon, and was declared as such. We now give
more quantitative statements which are proven in the
Supplemental Material [17] (together with detailed de-
scriptions of both RBSP and I1DC).
For the described RBSP protocol, property (A) holds
except with probability pfail and properties (B) and (C)
hold except with probability pabort. These probabilities
pabort and pfail can be bounded as functions of the trans-
mittance T and the parameter N as follows:
pfail; pabort  exp

NT
4
18

: (7)
Using the bound on pfail, the trace distance between the
perfectly blind qubit state and the state  generated by
RBSP can be bounded as
1
2
k   EðjþihþjÞ k pfail
for a fixed CPTP map E independent of . From this, by
the criterion given in expression (6), the bound given in
Eq. (7) and the union bound, we have that a protocol using
the RBSP generated states is  blind with  
S expðNT4=18Þ, where T is a lower bound on the channel
transmittance, and N the number of states used in each
instance of RBSP. These results are proven in detail in the
Supplemental Material [17] and collected in the following
main theorem:
Theorem 1.—A UBQC protocol of computation size S,
where the client’s preparation phase is replaced with S calls
to the coherent state remote blind qubit state preparation
protocol, with a lossy channel connecting the client and the
server of transmittance no less than T, is correct,  robust
and  blind for a chosen  > 0 if the parameter N of each
instance of the remote blind qubit state preparation proto-
col called is chosen as follows:
N  18 lnðS=Þ
T4
:
We acknowledge that the RBSP protocol is not immune
to noise in the channel or to significant preparation errors
on the side of the client. A method of performing RBSP in
a fault-tolerant way, by adapting techniques used to ensure
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the fault tolerance of UBQC itself [1,6,27], is under inves-
tigation by the authors. However, noise can only jeopardize
the correctness of our protocol, but never the guaranteed
security levels.
Conclusions and outlook.—In this work we have ad-
dressed the security of UBQC under the presence of im-
perfections through the concept of  blindness. Following
this we have given a remote qubit state preparation pre-
protocol which allows a client, with access to weak coher-
ent pulses only, to enjoy UBQC with arbitrary levels of
security.
The transition from the idealized setting of UBQC using
single photon qubits to the present protocol using weak
coherent pulses brings UBQC significantly closer to real-
life applications for, e.g., an unconditionally secure quan-
tum network. The parallel with the evolution of QKD is
also very interesting. Note that in QKD, weak coherent
pulses were not very attractive for long distance commu-
nication before the invention of protocols with decoy states
[28]. Indeed, these decoy states made the optimal intensity
 of the attenuated laser be roughly a constant, in contrast
with the optimal  T without decoy states. In the case of
UBQC, it might also be the case that decoy states could
improve the optimal value of  and therefore significantly
decrease the required number of weak coherent pulses used
in an instance of RBSP for a given computation.
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